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Abstract
Emma Borg has defined semantic minimalism as the thesis that the 
literal content of well-formed declarative sentences is truth-evaluable, 
fully determined by their lexico-syntactic features, and recoverable 
by language users with no need to access non-linguistic information. 
The task of this article is threefold. First, I shall raise a criticism to 
Borg’s minimalism based on how speakers disambiguate homonymy. 
Second, I will explore some ways Borg might respond to my argument 
and maintain that none of them offers a conclusive reply to my case. 
Third, I shall suggest that in order for Borg’s minimalism to best ac-
commodate the problem discussed in this paper, it should allow for 
semantically incomplete content and be converted into a claim about 
linguistic competence.
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1 Introduction
Emma Borg (2004, 2012) has characterized semantic minimalism 
as the natural inheritor of a formal semantics approach to senten-
tial meaning and has defended the idea of a purely lexico-syntactic 
route to propositional content. In her view, literal content for well-
formed declarative sentences is truth-evaluable, fully determined by 
their lexico-syntactic features, and recoverable by language users 
with no need to access contextual information or world knowledge. 
Sentences have their truth-conditional content determined indepen-
dently of non-linguistic factors, and the contribution of context to 
the recovery of sentential meaning is limited to the saturation of a 
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narrow class of indexical expressions. Semantic minimalism thus op-
poses contextualist, relativist and occasion-sensitive views maintain-
ing that the bearers of propositional content are utterances, rejects 
the all-pervasive constructive role for non-linguistic context envis-
aged by dual pragmatics, proposes that the proper task of semantic 
theories is to account for the literal meaning of sentences rather than 
for the communicated content of speech acts, and is committed to 
an orthodox view of compositionality, according to which, barring 
explicit indexicals, the truth-evaluable content of sentential expres-
sions is entirely a function of the combination of their syntactic archi-
tecture with the stable semantic input of their lexical constituents.1
Understood along these lines, semantic minimalism is vulnerable 
to two fundamental arguments (Borg 2012: 48-49):
(i) Minimal propositions are explanatorily inert: literal truth-evalu-
able content plays no indispensable role in (accounting for) 
the cognitive processes whereby speakers assign pragmatic 
meaning to declarative sentences;
(ii) Minimal propositions are impossible: some declarative sentenc-
es fail to convey (or encode) literal truth-evaluable content 
thanks to their lexico-syntactic elements alone.
To start, let us focus on argument (i). The bulk of the objection (a 
clear formulation of which can be found, e.g., in Recanati 2004: 18-
22) is that the entertainment of literal truth-evaluable content needs 
not be always included in the series of mental processes whereby 
speakers recover speech act content or pragmatically enriched mean-
ing. If on a hot summer night I tell my thirsty friend John ‘There is 
beer in the fridge’, it seems there is no need for him to consciously 
or unconsciously entertain the literal proposition there is beer in the 
fridge in order to understand that the beer I am talking about is pre-
sumably contained in cans or bottles, rather than spilled everywhere 
in the fridge. In other words, John needs not entertain overt quanti-
fication to determine intended quantification: he can get straight to 
1 For an overview of the main tenets of Borg’s minimalism, see Borg 2007, 
2009. Korta, Perry 2006, Jaszczolt 2007 and Stojanovic 2008 are equally useful 
introductions to the positions surrounding the debate on semantic minimalism.
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intended quantification, with no intermediate literal stops. Some-
thing similar appears to happen in the spontaneous enrichment of 
sentences with unarticulated content (e.g., ‘The baby cried and the 
mother [+ of the baby] picked it up’), in the recovery of the intended 
meaning of sentences requiring context-driven quantifier domain 
restrictions (e.g., ‘There is no one at work, everyone went to the 
party’), in the interpretation of adjectives whose conventional se-
mantic value is prima facie unable to function as a propositional con-
stituent prior to contextual input (e.g., ‘Paul is ready’: for what?), in 
the comprehension of sentences containing presuppositions that fail 
to be accommodated by the context of utterance (e.g., ‘The dog is 
thirsty’ when no salient dog can be identified),2 or in the evaluation 
of sentences with gradable predicates (e.g., ‘Mary is tall’).3 Since, the 
argument goes, these cases prove that the entertainment of literal 
truth conditions is sometimes unnecessary to determine pragmati-
cally enriched content, semantic minimalism is wrong in requiring 
the composition of literal truth conditions to take place even in cases 
where minimal propositions make no contribution to the recovery of 
pragmatic meaning.
The rationale of this paper is that Borg’s minimalism is suscepti-
ble to the same variety of objection even if we focus on the determi-
nation of literal sentential meaning itself, and that there is no need to 
2 As the informed reader will know, Frege and Strawson proposed that in 
similar cases the sentence fails to result in a logical form capable of having a truth 
value. This view of presuppositions is well-established in linguistics: see Heim 
1983, Van der Sandt 1992, Beaver 2001.
3 In this case, the argument from the contextualist side runs as follows. 
Propositions have truth values relative to circumstances of evaluation. If circum-
stances of evaluation are possible worlds, then propositions have truth values 
relative to worlds (i.e., intensions). So if there is a minimal proposition literally 
expressed by every utterance of ‘Mary is tall’ at every context of use, ‘Mary is 
tall’ must have an intension. At this point, contextualists conclude modo tollente 
that since the gradable adjective tall makes it impossible for ‘Mary is tall’ to have 
an intension in the standard sense of the term, there is no stable proposition liter-
ally expressed at every utterance of ‘Mary is tall’. For an attempt to address the 
problem in a synthesis of semantic minimalism and radical contextualism, see 
the non-indexical contextualism of MacFarlane 2007, 2009. See Davis 2013 for 
a fresh discussion of MacFarlane’s proposal. More on the semantics of gradable 
adjectives in, e.g., Kennedy 2007.
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point at the interplay of literal truth conditions and pragmatically en-
riched meaning to maintain that minimalism fails to match our best 
assumptions about the role of truth-evaluable content in meaning 
recovery. Bearing this in mind, my type (i) aim will be to argue that 
there are well-formed declarative sentences such that they cannot 
be assigned a literal truth-evaluable content through lexico-syntac-
tic processing alone. This will lead me to the contention that there 
are cases of sentential meaning construction where the recovery of 
truth-evaluable content cannot be based exclusively on linguistic 
knowledge and, in turn, to the type (ii) claim that sentences whose 
literal meaning can be determined only via an interactive procedure 
of the above kind fail to convey a literal truth-evaluable content un-
less they are processed on the basis of information exceeding the 
boundaries of linguistic knowledge (§2). I shall explore some ways 
the minimalist might respond to this objection and argue that none 
of them offers a conclusive reply to my case (§§3,4). Finally, I will 
suggest that Borg’s minimalism should allow for semantically incom-
plete content and be converted from a thesis about lexico-syntactic 
performance into a claim about lexico-syntactic competence (§5).
2 Homonymy
Consider the sentence ‘A pupil was in the middle of the classroom’. 
Due to the presence of classroom, speakers exposed to this sentence 
preferentially interpret the homonymous word pupil as conveying the 
sense young student, despite the fact that pupil can also be taken to 
mean eye opening. Accordingly, they tend to perceive ‘A pupil was in 
the middle of the classroom’ as a semantically definite expression de-
spite the ambiguity of pupil. They might perceive pupil as ambiguous 
in the earliest stages of the speech input, when they have not yet been 
provided with any clue as to how pupil should be disambiguated. But 
as soon as they get to hear classroom, they spontaneously select young 
student as the most plausible sense to be assigned to pupil. The 
whole process runs plausibly (and very roughly) as follows.4 First, 
4 For the relevant empirical research, see any recent handbook of psycho-
linguistics with a good section on lexical processing (e.g., Traxler 2011, Spivey, 
McRae, Joanisse 2012 or Harley 2014). Klepousniotou 2002 and Morris 2006 
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the content words and the functional items occurring in ‘A pupil 
was in the middle of the classroom’ are linearly paired with a provi-
sional semantic interpretation. Unambiguous words are paired with 
a single sense, whereas pupil is paired with both its alternative senses, 
and all the senses thus activated are deposited in working memory. 
Parallel morphosyntactic processing supervises the construction of 
the phrase structure for the activated senses and yields the proto-
proposition a [young student / eye opening] was in the middle of 
the classroom. In order to associate ‘A pupil was in the middle of the 
classroom’ with a definite set of truth conditions, the speaker now 
needs to select one of the two candidate interpretations of pupil. To 
this end, a [young student / eye opening] was in the middle of the 
classroom is transferred into a post-semantic workspace which con-
trasts the statistical likelihood of a young student was in the middle 
of the classroom with that of an eye opening was in the middle of 
the classroom, pares away eye opening as otiose, selects young stu-
dent and delivers the truth-evaluable string a young student was in 
the middle of the classroom.
The exact nature of the selection occurring at the end of this 
process is not immediately relevant for our purposes: it could be a 
statistical inference computing on the frequency of the senses as-
signed to pupil in previous occasions of use, or it could involve the 
access to some rule-like constraint binding the interpretation of pu-
pil to young student whenever pupil is used in a sentence contain-
ing a relevant occurrence of classroom. Regardless of this, there is 
a single important point to be made for the purposes of our argu-
ment. Namely, post-semantic selection is indispensable to pair the 
input sentence with a definite truth-evaluable content: without the 
reduction of [young student / eye opening] to young student, the 
comprehender is bound to be unable to associate ‘A pupil was in the 
middle of the classroom’ with a single set of truth conditions. Albeit 
I doubt that the reader has ever stepped into a classroom and spot-
ted a bare human eye right at the center of it, there is plenty of con-
ceivable contexts of utterance where construing pupil as eye opening 
both offer a nice introduction to the psychology of word sense disambiguation. 
Small, Cottrell, Tanenhaus 1988 is also a comprehensive, though earlier refer-
ence work on the subject.
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would make it an impeccable referential label for an object standing 
in the middle of a classroom (similar cases are discussed, e.g., in 
Searle 1980, Pelczar 2000, Recanati 2004). Simply put, there are no 
linguistic reasons why the interpreter should prefer young student 
over eye opening, and it is impossible to require that the information 
whereby agents select young student be part of their command of 
the lexico-syntactic properties of English. The discriminating fac-
tor, here, is world knowledge.5 Contra Borg, there seems to be no 
definite “what is said”6 without appealing to information outside the 
language faculty here, because unless the two candidates to the sta-
tus of truth-evaluable content conveyed by ‘A pupil was in the middle 
of the classroom’ are tested against a background of relevant non-
linguistic knowledge, it is impossible to assign the sentence a single 
literal meaning.7
Now, while many accept that encoded conventional meaning is 
typically non-propositional and observe that in most cases disambig-
uation and reference determination are needed to obtain truth con-
ditions (e.g., see Devitt 2013), semantic minimalism wants encoded 
5 A quick counterexample might be useful to clarify this point. The verb find 
is highly polysemous: it can express locate, believe, realize and plenty of other 
fine-grained senses. Suppose we need to interpret the sentence ‘Mark found that 
the show was boring’ and are asked to choose which, among locate and believe, 
is the sense to be assigned to find. To do this, we do not need world knowledge, 
because it is part of our word-level command of the combinatorial properties of 
find that when the object slot of its argument structure is filled by a sentential 
complement, the verb cannot be interpreted as locate (as in, e.g., ‘Mark found 
the cat’). The situation is different in ‘A pupil was in the middle of the classroom’: 
in this case, a non-linguistic input is indispensable to perform sense selection.
6 By ‘what is said’, I simply mean the conventional truth-conditional features 
that can be ascribed by a speaker A to a sentence S in virtue of the linguistic 
properties of S (hence, in virtue of A’s being a competent user of the language in 
which S is expressed).
7 Naturally, the example I have chosen is just one among many possible in-
stances of homonymy, both balanced (i.e., based on word forms licensing equally 
dominant senses, such as cell or panel) and unbalanced (i.e., based on word forms 
whose alternative senses are asymmetric in frequency, such as ball or port). More 
precisely: in ‘A pupil was in the middle of the classroom’, pupil is a balanced hom-
onym occurring in a biased sentential context, that boosts the statistical likeli-
hood of young student.
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conventional meaning to be inherently propositional. Which makes 
disambiguation a problematic case. Borg (2004: 140-146; 2012: 90-
91, 171-172) lucidly recognizes the issue and provides some nicely 
argued answers regarding how it should be accommodated in the 
context of her minimalist proposal. In what follows, I will argue 
that none of such answers is entirely convincing. To be fair, I will 
never claim to have identified a knock-out case against Borg’s thesis, 
but I think I can reasonably show that the best assumptions we can 
make about the dynamics of word sense disambiguation cast some 
significant doubts on the overall plausibility of minimal semantics. 
To proceed, let us examine how Borg suggests that her theory can 
accommodate cases of lexical ambiguity of the sort contemplated in 
‘A pupil was in the middle of the classroom’. According to Borg, 
minimal semantics can deal with them because disambiguation pro-
cesses typically fall into one of the following cases.
(D1) Pre-Linguistic Disambiguation. Sense selection occurs before 
lexico-syntactic processing. Only one of the two senses of 
pupil is inputted to lexico-syntactic processing and only one 
of the two truth-evaluable contents licensed by the sentence 
is built.
(D2) Post-Linguistic Disambiguation. Sense selection occurs after lex-
ico-syntactic processing. The sentence is heard as ambiguous 
and both its alternative truth-evaluable contents are built. 
After the two truth-evaluable contents have been allowed 
to leave the language faculty, general intelligence selects one 
and suppresses the other.
(D3) Linguistic Disambiguation. Sense selection occurs inside lexico-
syntactic processing. This can happen in three ways.
(D3a) Both senses of the homonym are inputted to lexico-syntactic 
processing but only one is used to interpret the sentence, due 
to a habitualized preference. For example, the subject’s pre-
vious encounters with the homonym have established a selec-
tional tendency based on which her language faculty sponta-
neously computes one of the two senses and pares away the 
other.
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(D3b) Both senses of the homonym are inputted to lexico-syntac-
tic processing but one is immediately suppressed thanks to 
knowledge about the preceding discourse context.
(D3c) Both senses of the homonym are inputted to lexico-syntactic 
processing and used to interpret the sentence. General intel-
ligence intrudes into lexico-syntactic processing and oper-
ates as a selective inhibitor on one of the two truth-evaluable 
contents licensed by the sentence, before they are allowed to 
leave the language faculty.
3.1 Pre-linguistic disambiguation
Let us start with (D1): only one of the two senses of pupil is input-
ted to lexico-syntactic processing. Borg’s proposal can be spelled 
out in two ways. First, preferential sense activation is direct, uncon-
strained and obtains independently of the general intelligence of the 
interpreter (let us name this hypothesis D1a). Second, preferential 
sense activation is the output of the early resolution of a constraint-
satisfaction problem and obtains thanks to the general intelligence of 
the interpreter (let us name this hypothesis D1b). Opting for (D1a) 
would clash with a good deal of classic experimental literature on 
lexical access observing that in the earliest stages of language in-
terpretations tasks, all the alternative senses of an ambiguous word 
are activated (regardless of which is more dominant or contextually 
appropriate) to be later selected via the acquaintance with semantic 
and non-linguistic context (e.g., Swinney 1979; Tanenhaus, Leiman, 
Seidenberg 1979; Seidenberg et al. 1982; Folk, Morris 2003; Mason, 
Just 2007). As for (D1b), the hypothesis could be reconciled with 
Borg’s minimalism on condition that the general-purpose processes 
involved in pre-semantic filtering required no input from lexico-syn-
tactic analysis, i.e., that pre-semantic filtering and lexico-syntactic 
analysis were two serially ordered processes among which there oc-
curred a rigidly unidirectional interaction. Yet, it seems that in or-
der for constrained sense activation to obtain, a rather rich flow of 
information from pre-semantic filtering to lexico-syntactic analysis 
and back from lexico-syntactic analysis to pre-semantic filtering has 
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to take place. To appreciate this, let us observe that there are two es-
sential ways in which Borg’s appeal to (D1b) can be put to work. The 
first would be to assume that constrained sense activation is gener-
ated by a world knowledge default (§3.1.1). The second would be to 
opt for a salience-first model of lexical access (§3.1.2).
3.1.1 World knowledge defaults
Assume that the retrieval of the senses of pupil is controlled by a 
world knowledge default (WKD) that constrains lexical access to 
the activation of young student by computing on information pro-
vided in the position occupied by classroom (easy test: were the source 
sentence ‘A pupil was in the middle of an eye’, the interpretation 
accessed for pupil would have been eye opening).8 Now ask: is it pos-
sible for speakers to recruit the WKD and bring it to bear on the 
operations of the language faculty before lexico-syntactic processing 
has started? The answer to this question seems bound to be negative, 
since without some early lexico-syntactic breakdown of the sentence 
it is impossible for speakers to determine that the syntagmatic posi-
tion occupied by classroom is the one containing the information that 
is relevant for the disambiguation of pupil. If it is true that subjects 
selectively retrieve young student because of a WKD based on a ste-
reotypical representation of the objects they are more likely to find 
in classrooms, it is also true that the WKD can be brought to bear 
on the disambiguation of pupil only if some rudimentary construc-
8 Incidentally, let it be noted that the default can be modeled with the toolkit 
of standard information theory. The idea is to measure the amount of informa-
tion required to disambiguate among candidate interpretations for an ambiguous 
word in terms of entropy generated by candidate interpretations in the set of its 
senses, and posit that only the interpretation generating the lowest entropy will 
be activated. If H is the entropy, P is a measure of probability, M is the set of the 
senses of pupil, C is the set of contextual bits of information available in the inter-
pretation of ‘A pupil was in the middle of the classroom’, cl is classroom, ys is young 
student, and eo is eye opening, then the preferential activation of young student 
can be predicted on grounds that H[ys|C] < H[eo|C], which is to say: – ∑cl∈C P(cl) 
∑ys∈M P(ys|cl) logP(ys|cl) < – ∑cl∈C P(cl) ∑eo∈M P(eo|cl) logP(eo|cl). More gener-
ally, classroom is a relevant bit of contextual information because cl∈C and H[M] 
> H[M|C], that is, – ∑m∈M P(m) logP(m) > – ∑cl∈C P(cl) ∑m∈M P(m|cl) logP(m|cl), 
with m being an interpretation of pupil. See Cover, Thomas 2006.
Luca Gasparri 156
tion of the logical form of the sentence and some exploratory analysis 
of its lexical items have already established at least what follows: (i) 
that pupil is an ambiguous item describing the value of the predicate 
variable of an existential quantifier; (ii) that classroom is the most sa-
lient element of an optional argument signaling the location of the 
object labeled as pupil; (iii) that classroom “means” classroom. Unless 
this body of information has been processed by the lexico-syntactic 
parser, general intelligence is bound to be unable to determine which 
among the many WKDs the agent is acquainted with should be ac-
cessed and exploited for preferential sense activation. In this sense, 
(D1b) can be treated as a variant of (D3c), and its viability comes to 
depend on the possibility of reconciling Borg’s minimalism with the 
existence of a dense informational interface between lexico-syntac-
tic processing and general intelligence.
3.1.2 Salience-first access
Here the minimalist might want to observe that the psychological 
story we have recapitulated in §2 is not completely accurate or unbi-
ased, since some evidence has been taken to shown that in the earli-
est stages of utterance processing ambiguous words do not always 
activate the entire range of their alternative senses, but are some-
times paired with a single “contextually salient” meaning (see, e.g., 
Giora 2003, 2012). If the rest of the phrase structure accepts the 
salient meaning (i.e., the incorporation of the salient meaning does 
not generate syntactic or semantic anomalies), the salient meaning 
is preserved and the string is allowed to leave the language faculty. 
Otherwise, if the rest of the phrase structure does not support the 
salient meaning (e.g., the salient meaning makes a predicate invali-
date a selectional restriction or pushes a complement to violate the 
argument structure of its verb), the lexico-syntactic module activates 
a backtracking function which inhibits the salient meaning and re-
cruits a more appropriate sense for the ambiguous word. Now, if we 
claim that the preferential activation of the salient sense is stimulated 
directly by the context of utterance, we face the same problem en-
countered in the discussion of (D1a) (i.e., in the earliest stages of lan-
guage interpretations tasks, all the alternative senses of an ambiguous 
word are activated regardless of which is contextually appropriate). 
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On the other hand, if we construe salience as a feature engendering 
preferential sense activation on the basis of the interpreter’s previous 
linguistic experience (i.e., all the alternative senses of the ambiguous 
word are activated but only the most prominent has enough statisti-
cal strength to get to the composition phase), we face two different 
problems. First, by allowing that linguistic experience can have a 
constructive role in arranging the dominance of the senses associated 
to the mental representations of word forms, Borg would endorse a 
notion of lexical knowledge which is much more idiosyncratic and 
open-ended than the formalist picture of linguistic competence she 
aims to safeguard (2012: chapter 6). Second, it appears that the string 
built by lexico-syntactic processing with the dominant sense of the 
homonym must be verified by an additional abductive stage in order 
to be definitively validated. The most indicative reason for this is 
that backtracking can be requested even after the string built by the 
lexico-syntactic parser has left the linguistic module. Suppose we are 
dealing with a native speaker of English S who is informed about the 
ambiguity of pupil and whose previous linguistic experience is such 
that S has been prevalently exposed to uses of pupil where the word 
was intended to mean eye opening. At some point, S is presented with 
‘A pupil was in the middle of the classroom’. S detects the word pu-
pil, preferentially accesses eye opening and integrates it in the phrase 
structure of the sentence. Is this sufficient to predict that S will vali-
date the string constructed by interpreting pupil as eye opening? Of 
course not. S could still evaluate that the string including eye open-
ing embeds a heuristically questionable interpretation of the sentence 
because the reading she has spontaneously assigned to pupil displays 
an insufficient degree of encyclopedic consistency with the rest of 
the sentential context, and activate backtracking to replace it with 
a less atypical interpretation. The moral is simple: when it comes to 
cases where the competitor interpretations for an ambiguous word 
generate truth-conditional strings which are equally acceptable if 
tested against the desiderata of lexico-syntactic well-formedness, it is 
impossible to require the language faculty to be responsible for the 
unreflective sense of implausibility a speaker accessing eye opening 
first could feel in evaluating whether the interpretation she has as-
signed to our sentence is attractive. Yet, it seems that such a stage 
of weighted abduction is a constitutive part of the array of mental 
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processes whereby cognizers assign literal content to sentences, and 
it is not entirely clear how this could be reconciled, to borrow Borg’s 
(2004: 142) own words, with the somewhat “ascetic” postulation of 
a self-contained lexico-syntactic route to sentential meaning.
3.2 Post-linguistic disambiguation
Let us now turn to (D2). Borg depicts the following scenario: the 
sentence ‘A pupil was in the middle of the classroom’ is heard as am-
biguous and both its alternative truth-evaluable meanings are built. 
After the two truth-evaluable strings have been allowed to leave the 
language faculty, general intelligence selects one and suppresses the 
other. Now, I have no complaints against the idea that disambigua-
tion might sometimes follow this routine, but I do have some doubts 
regarding the compatibility between the existence of processes of 
post-linguistic disambiguation and Borg’s minimalism. It is true that 
in cases of this sort lexico-syntactic calculus does a fundamental part 
of the job required to construct the truth-evaluable content speak-
ers preferentially associate with the target sentence. Be it made of a 
single structured string with an underspecified lexical slot (a [young 
student / eye opening] was in the middle of the classroom), be it 
made of two fully truth-evaluable strings to be evaluated and select-
ed as wholes (a young student was in the middle of the classroom 
vs. an eye opening was in the middle of the classroom), the acquain-
tance with the lexico-syntactic features of our sentence yields some 
semantically informative content. Yet, by dropping the tenet that the 
truth-evaluable content of well-formed declarative sentences is al-
ways and entirely dictated by lexico-syntactic processing, minimal-
ism would dispose of the key claim thanks to which it promised to 
offer an interesting and controversial insight on language processing 
in the first place. The point of Borg’s minimalism is not to merely 
suggest that lexico-syntactic calculus and linguistic knowledge have 
a crucial and modularly defined role in the recovery of sentential 
meaning, or that they are “usually” sufficient to obtain truth-evalu-
able content. The point of Borg’s minimalism (e.g., 2012: 48) is to 
propose that lexico-syntactic calculus and linguistic competence are 
all it takes to build semantically complete content, and it is difficult 
not to remain skeptical about how the case we have discussed is sup-
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posed to meet this Davidsonian desideratum. The very choice of label-
ing comparable processes of disambiguation as ‘post-semantic’ looks 
unwarranted. Granted, they are supposed to intervene on the output 
of the Fodorian module Borg assigns to lexico-syntactic processing 
and, in this sense, their temporal niche naturally falls in the post-
modular inferential phase. But if it is true that they are indispensable 
to generate (rather than modulate or enrich) the literal content of 
the sentence in need of disambiguation, is it still fair to characterize 
them as something bona fide “post-semantic”?
3.3 Linguistic disambiguation
Finally, let us turn to (D3). Borg suggests that it is possible to locate 
disambiguation within lexico-syntactic processing while preserv-
ing the minimalist framework in three scenarios, respectively cor-
responding to (D3a), (D3b) and (D3c). In the first case, both the 
senses of pupil are inputted to lexico-syntactic processing but only 
one is used to interpret the sentence, due to a habitualized prefer-
ence. In the second case, both the senses of pupil are inputted to 
lexico-syntactic processing, but one is rapidly suppressed thanks to 
information acquired from the preceding discourse context. In the 
third case, both the senses of pupil are inputted to lexico-syntactic 
processing and used to interpret the sentence, but general intelli-
gence acts as a selective inhibitor on one of the two truth-evaluable 
contents licensed by the sentence while they are being built.
As for (D3a), it seems that adhering to this line of reply would 
again relax the notion of ‘linguistic knowledge’ beyond the limits tol-
erated by Borg’s commitment to a formalist understanding of natural 
language semantics. As we observed in §3.1.2, by accepting that fac-
tors such as conventionality, distributional frequency and familiarity 
can affect the offline dominance of the senses associated to word 
forms in the mental lexicon, the minimalist would endorse a view 
of lexical competence which is much more “pragmatic” than the one 
its intellectualist understanding of semantic competence should aim 
to sustain. More precisely, if the representational repertoire under-
pinning our ability to make competent use of word forms contained 
instructions of type ‘(when embedded in the semantic context C) 
the word w preferentially takes the sense m’, word knowledge would 
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more closely mirror the abductively rich notion of lexical semantic 
knowledge adopted by cognitive linguists (e.g., Evans 2009) and by 
most NLP approaches to word sense disambiguation (e.g., Manning, 
Schütze 1999; Agirre, Edmonds 2006), rather than the axiomatic-
logicistic picture of lexical meaning envisaged by Borg (e.g., 2010).
As for (D3b) and (D3c), I suspect that allowing linguistic per-
formance to be inhibited by the discourse context would jeopardize 
Borg’s appeal to a modularist account of lexico-syntactic processing. 
Borg (2004: 93, 144; 2012: 64) is right in observing that allowing 
information about the discourse context to play a role as a selective 
top-down filter on meaning construction processes is very different 
from making room for the kind of all-pervasive constructive role 
for non-linguistic context envisaged by some contextualists. Even 
so, the “intrusion” licensed by Borg seems far from innocent here: 
however weakly one chooses to interpret it, it remains based on the 
assumption that the core computations of the lexico-syntactic mod-
ule can be stopped by the short-term representations in which the 
interpreter has stored the background information she has acquired 
from the discourse context. This would be absolutely fine in a prag-
matically-oriented approach such as discourse representation theory 
(Kamp, Reyle 1993), segmented discourse representation theory 
(Asher, Lascarides 2003), or file change semantics (Heim 1988), but 
seems to clash with Borg’s appeal to a full-fledged Fodorian picture 
of lexico-syntactic processing (which includes the mandatoriness re-
quirement: in order for some system to constitute a module, its op-
erations must run to completion every time they are switched on by 
presentation of a relevant stimulus; see Fodor 1983).9 Hence, even 
if the susceptibility to inhibition displayed by linguistic performance 
9 Other studies support the same worry. For example, Bicknell et al. 2010 
and Matsuki et al. 2011 report an increase in reading times for sentences in which 
an agent-verb combination is followed by a statistically incongruent (though lin-
guistically plausible) patient (e.g., ‘The journalist checked the spelling of his lat-
est report’ vs. ‘The mechanic checked the spelling of his latest report’). The 
immediacy of this slowdown would seem to require either that world knowledge 
must be embedded in the lexicon, or else that world knowledge can affect the 
amount of time required to carry out the analysis of the linguistic properties of 
a sentence by manipulating the operations of the lexico-syntactic parser while 
they are being performed. Both options look problematic for minimal semantics.
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in word sense disambiguation were as selective as Borg believes it 
is, this could still be sufficient to conclude, contra the minimalist, 
that lexico-syntactic processing should be better characterized as a 
weakly modular system, i.e., domain-specific and designed to con-
tribute to the construction of truth-evaluable content by interfacing 
its operations with information exceeding the knowledge base of the 
lexico-syntactic parser. Ironically enough, the very idea Borg is so 
concerned with rejecting (i.e., broadening the data base of linguistic 
processing so as to make it compute information outside the lexico-
syntactic province) might be the best way to safeguard the minimal-
ist thesis that lexico-syntactic processing is systematically sufficient 
to assign sentences a truth-evaluable content via a fully modular in-
formation processing routine.
4 Multiplying types
I add to the list of possible responses an answer that Borg does not 
consider explicitly, but that I find worth articulating and discuss-
ing. Let me express it in the form of a question: why not conceive 
a young student was in the middle of the classroom and an eye 
opening was in the middle of the classroom as the (minimal) propo-
sitions expressed by two different sentence-types whose respective 
English instantiations happen to be phonographically indiscernible? 
After all, homonymy is standardly understood as an n-ary relation 
between different terms that share the same spelling and pronuncia-
tion (e.g., Murphy 2010). So it should stand to reason to argue that 
the possibility to pair our sentence with two truth-evaluable con-
tents arises because ‘The pupil was in the middle of the classroom’ is 
the realization of two sentence-types that in English happen to be ex-
pressed through utterances and inscriptions sharing the same surface 
properties. The argument could run as follows: (i) the distinction 
between a young student was in the middle of the classroom and 
an eye opening was in the middle of the classroom corresponds to 
the distinction between two sentence-types, α and β; (ii) the logical 
forms of α and β terminate in the subject position with different NPs 
(α hosts the constituent pupilα, while β hosts the constituent pupilβ); 
(iii) since pupilα and pupilβ are homonyms in English, the difference 
between the sets of lexical types respectively hosted by α and β can-
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not be expressed in the surface realization of α and β; (iv) based on 
(i-iii), disambiguating pupil actually amounts to determining whether 
we should process α or β; (v) once the relevant sentence-type (α or 
β) has been selected, its logical form can be recovered via the infor-
mation processing routine evoked by the minimalist. The argument 
looks viable and the minimalist can endorse it, perhaps reinforcing 
it via psycholinguistic claims about homonyms’ having a separate 
mental representation for each of their alternative senses (see, e.g., 
Frazier, Rayner 1990; Klein, Murphy 2001; Beretta, Fiorentino, Po-
eppel 2005; Brown 2008), and via a suitably strengthened version 
of the hidden homonymy approach to color terms ambiguity argued 
by Kennedy and McNally (2010), a line of argument Borg herself 
(2012: 91) is sympathetic with. The problem is that since the English 
instantiations of α and β are indiscernible and therefore bound to be 
perceived as a single phonographic input, the theoretical distinction 
between the two sentence-types cannot be used to increase the plau-
sibility of Borg’s account of the psychology of language processing. 
As the disambiguation between α and β cannot be performed on the 
basis of phonological, presuppositional, graphic or intonational vari-
ables, ceteris paribus their presentation is bound to be perceived as the 
presentation of the same sentence and to trigger the same cognitive 
responses across occasions of interpretation.
To have a clearer grasp of the problem, think of quantifier raising 
in structurally ambiguous sentences such as ‘Some boy loves every 
girl’ (let us name this sentence S). Here we have one surface form 
admitting two logical forms (LFs), depending on which of the two 
quantifiers is assigned the wider scope (∃ > ∀ vs. ∀ > ∃). In this 
case, the argument from the minimalist side could run as follows. 
Since every well-formed sentence-type is paired with just one LF, 
the possibility to dislocate the quantifiers of S from their surface po-
sition to their scope position in two ways proves that S is the surface 
realization of two sentence-types. Accordingly, the assumption of a 
purely lexico-syntactic route to sentential meaning can be preserved 
on grounds that it cannot be the case that the cognitive processes 
involved in the treatment of the two types are the same: they are dis-
tinct and each consistent with the minimalist view of sentence pro-
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cessing.10 Once more, the reply looks viable, but it seems it under-
estimates an important detail: unless some independent input as to 
which of the two quantifier dislocations should be favored is given, it 
is impossible to determine the literal content conveyed by S (qua pho-
nographic input) by relying only on the lexical and syntactic features 
that are manifested at the surface level. It is more than reasonable to 
expect the cognitive processes involved in the construction of its two 
interpretations to be different, but neither of the two can be prefer-
entially triggered if context does not provide some disambiguation 
clue signaling which of the two types fits the conversational setting. 
Which means, in turn, that the minimalist can count on this line of 
reply on condition that lexico-syntactic processing operates direct-
ly on disambiguated sentence-types rather than on surface forms, 
thereby evading the question of how (if not via context-sensitive 
lexico-syntactic processing) we identify sentence-types and evaluate 
their contextual plausibility in the first place. Borg might wish to 
insist that the case is easy to accommodate within her proposal, since 
she agrees that non-linguistic information can play a role in letting 
context help select one of the two sentence-types via the selection of 
its LF. If this were the case, Borg would still fall short of her aspira-
tion to offer a realistic explanation of meaning recovery: in order to 
get to truth-evaluable content, you must pass through LF selection, 
and lexico-syntactic processing alone will not do it. In other words, 
if semantic minimalism wants to live up to its psychological ambi-
tions and give us a plausible story about how agents competent in a 
linguistic idiom come to grasp the meaning of sentences expressed in 
that idiom, it should tell us something about how we go from being 
exposed to unprocessed collections of phonographic events to the 
entertainment of truth-evaluable thoughts. Unfortunately, it is diffi-
cult to tell how narrowing the framework down to an account of the 
processes governing the assignation of truth conditions to abstract 
LFs could produce a cognitively instructive account of semantic per-
formance (or even of a stage of semantic performance).11
10 I am grateful to Emma Borg for pressing me to address this point.
11 In addition, it should perhaps be observed that while the low semantic over-
lap characterizing the alternative meanings of a homonym is consistent with an 
appeal to the distinction between lexical types, the same strategy is unlikely to 
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Very crudely put, it seems that the minimalist has to choose sides. 
Either she restricts herself to arguing that her claims are intended 
to spell out the deductive aspects of the semantics of sentence-types 
and that her emphasis on ‘meaning recovery’ should be interpreted 
as a philosophically informed rationalization of the analytical routine 
whereby orthodox semanticists look into the truth-evaluable content 
of logically transparent types, or she bets on the hypothesis that her 
framework can be exploited to describe the mental processes where-
by ordinary speakers assign literal content to sentences in concrete 
and situated events of language use. If the latter option is the case, 
then my (admittedly epistemological) worry is that if minimalism 
does not aim to contemplate in some interesting fashion all that is in-
volved in the extraction of semantic information from surface forms, 
its appeal to a “purely lexico-syntactic route” to truth-evaluable con-
tent runs the risk of insisting on a notion of linguistic processing 
which has nothing to do with the way we use natural languages.
Part of this plea for empirical responsibility is insightfully recom-
mended by Borg, who adds that although minimalism is open to be 
disconfirmed by the psychological evidence, such evidence must be 
about speakers’ knowledge of their language, not about the psycho-
logical processes whereby speakers assign content to sentences (Borg 
2012: 64). Yet, even this caveat looks problematic if measured against 
the rest of Borg’s claims. First, it is generally well-established that lin-
guistic knowledge and the dynamics of utterance processing cannot 
be kept too separate, since any plausible theory of the organization of 
linguistic knowledge is bound to imply rather specific claims about 
the way such knowledge operates in language comprehension and 
production, and any plausible theory of the cognitive processes un-
derlying language use is bound to imply rather specific claims about 
the organization of linguistic knowledge.12 But more importantly, if 
result pursuable in cases of ambiguity generated by word forms whose possible 
senses are significantly more related. For example, it would be more contro-
versial to postulate a separate lexical type for each of the different senses of a 
polysemous verb like take. Yet, it seems to me that many of the objections this 
paper has raised against minimal semantics by focusing on the disambiguation of 
homonymy could be formulated just as fittingly by considering the processing of 
polysemy. For issues of space, I cannot elaborate further on this point.
12 For example, the psycholinguistic research on the mental lexicon is stan-
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the only type of evidence that can disconfirm Borg’s minimalism is 
about linguistic knowledge (which is by definition a matter of lin-
guistic competence), does this mean that Borg’s proposal should be 
evaluated exclusively with respect to its ability to account for linguis-
tic competence? In such a case, even if we agreed that minimalism 
is the best deal on the table to make sense of speakers’ command of 
their language, it is not immediately clear why the endorsement of a 
minimalist view of lexico-syntactic competence should ipso facto be 
interested in trading in the possibility to pair well-formed declara-
tive sentences with truth-evaluable content just through lexicon and 
syntax. That we should have a minimalist view of lexico-syntactic 
knowledge does not necessarily mean that we should have a minimal-
ist theory of lexico-syntactic performance: the two are very different 
animals. The same problem seems to undermine Borg’s vindication 
of the minimalist thesis as the natural inheritor of a modularist view 
of lexico-syntactic processing (e.g., 2012: 13). That we should have a 
modularist picture of lexico-syntactic processing does not necessar-
ily mean that we should have a modularist view of the entire range of 
processes involved in the recovery of propositional meaning: lexico-
syntactic processing might well satisfy the strong modularity con-
straint and yet be insufficient to generate truth-evaluable content. 
For example, one could easily endorse a Fodorian picture of lexico-
syntactic processing while maintaining that all the language faculty 
can do with a well-formed declarative sentence S is to pair S with an 
abstract template that relates to the truth-evaluable content eventu-
ally selected for S just as character relates to content in the variety of 
contextualism popularized by Kaplan.
5 Concluding remarks
To sum up. I have reviewed the main tenets on Borg’s framework 
and clarified the way the disambiguation of homonymy poses a chal-
lenge to the account of language processing proposed by semantic 
minimalism. I have then examined the solutions offered by Borg in 
order to accommodate the problem, and argued that none of them 
dardly understood as an attempt to infer claims about the nature of lexical rep-
resentations from the study of lexical activity. See, e.g., Jarema, Libben 2007.
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offers a fully convincing argument to embrace the austere picture 
of meaning recovery recommended by semantic minimalism against 
accounts of linguistic processing where the composition of truth-
conditional meaning is vastly context-dependent and richly inter-
faced with world knowledge and general purpose abilities.13 Now 
let me conclude with a couple more constructive proposals. First, 
I suggest that Borg should opt for a more nuanced picture of the 
limitations of lexico-syntactic processing and follow the recommen-
dation already argued, among others, by Bach (2007): do without 
propositionalism. Which means, give up on the claim that every 
well-formed (indexical-free) declarative sentence expresses a truth-
evaluable content which is fully determined by its lexico-syntactic 
features and recoverable with no need to access non-linguistic in-
formation, and make room for the notion of a ‘propositional radical’ 
(or for any other construct doing the same explanatory work carried 
out by propositional radicals, e.g., the schematic truth-conditional 
templates of relevance theorists). In Borg’s (2012: 208) terms: make 
room for the talk of incomplete logical forms and move toward the 
“perilous fine line” separating radical minimalism from contextual-
ism. Hence, allow that in some cases the best the acquaintance with 
the overt lexico-syntactic properties of a sentence can do is pair it 
with a truth-conditionally incomplete content, while denying that 
filling the gap required to turn it into a genuine truth-evaluable con-
tent has to be based on linguistic knowledge or to be classified as a 
semantic matter. Second, Borg’s minimalism may be much better 
off as an account of linguistic competence. To my understanding, it 
is not only possible, but perhaps even desirable to pair a modularly 
inspired understanding of lexico-syntactic knowledge with the view 
that the recovery of truth-evaluable content is a phenomenon which 
is designed to arise via the cooperation of linguistic and non-linguis-
tic information. One simple way to do this could be to introduce a 
13 Although in this article I have restricted myself to questioning Borg’s mini-
malism, the points I have tried to make should apply equally well to Cappelen 
and Lepore’s (2005) minimalism. The reason why I have chosen to confine my 
discussion to Borg’s work is simple. Semantic minimalism owes us an account of 
its empirical plausibility, but while Cappelen and Lepore tend to shy away from 
that task, Borg is eager to explore the psychological tenability of her assumptions. 
Which makes her work a more suitable contact point for my arguments.
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distinction between ‘knowledge modules’ and ‘processing modules’ 
(Coltheart 1999), and bet on the research hypothesis that lexico-
syntactic analysis is based on weakly modular (i.e., domain-specific 
and interactive) processor which computes on information retrieved 
from a strongly modular knowledge base, corresponding to what is 
standardly referred to as speakers’ “knowledge of the language”.
After all, if there is one lesson we can plausibly learn from the very 
existence of ambiguity in natural languages, that lesson is precisely 
that language processing is designed to interact with general purpose 
abilities. Functionalist accounts of ambiguity have long been arguing 
that the presence of ambiguity in natural languages should prove that 
the language faculty has not evolved for purposes of communication, 
since, if that were the case, linguistic forms would map bijectively 
to meanings, and comprehenders would not need to expend effort 
in inferring literal meaning or speech act content via non-linguistic 
information (e.g., Pinker, Bloom 1990; Chomsky 2002). On the con-
trary, it can be argued that ambiguity is in fact a desirable property of 
communication codes, because it allows for linguistic systems which 
are formally parsimonious, optimized for memorization and exploit-
able by drawing computational resources from different domains of 
cognition. As Piantadosi, Tily and Gibson (2012) have noted, there 
are two important facts that make ambiguity a desirable feature of 
linguistic systems and support the intuition that ambiguity results 
from a pressure for efficient communication. First, when sentential or 
extra-linguistic context is informative about meaning, a completely 
unambiguous language would become partly redundant with context 
and therefore inefficient (no wonder that homonyms and highly poly-
semous words preserve their ambiguity in a strikingly small propor-
tion of the cases in which they are embedded in a sentence or used 
in a speech act). Second, by mapping phonographic units to multiple 
meanings, ambiguity reduces the number and the length of word 
forms that have to be stored in the mental lexicon to secure efficient 
linguistic performance, maintains our internal word store at a low de-
gree of phonotactical complexity, and allows language users to speed 
up the transmission of information via speech despite the physiologi-
cal limitations of their articulatory apparatus (e.g., Levinson 2000).14
14 Many thanks to Emma Borg, François Recanati, Diego Marconi and Ja-
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